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HE HISTORICAL era in which we live has been designated as
the Anthropocene such is the degree of human intervention on
the planet. At a time when the world population has reached 7 billion, 
we are witnessing a rapid environmental degradation, as suggested by 
indicators of biodiversity loss, habitat destruction, water scarcity and 
distribution of pollutants. As a systemic and multi-dimensional 
problem, climate change stands as a strong symbol of human impact 
on the environment. Scientific research has shown unambiguously 
both the anthropogenic nature and the severity of the problem (e.g., 
IPCC, 2007a), and several recent studies suggest that its impacts 
could be more devastating than what is indicated by the projections 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, with the 




2007; Kiehl, 2011; Shakhova et al., 2010). While the likelihood of 
large-scale negative impacts of climate change continues to rise and 
consensus increases around this, various social forces, and policy-
makers in particular, continue to stall effective transformations to 
abate GHG emissions. 
The starting point for this chapter is the realization that while 
there are increasing signs that climate change presents enormous 
threats to life as we know it very little is (or has been) done about it. 
For a number of years, there has been a significantly high level of 
awareness around the world regarding the fact that we are faced with 
a series of environmental problems. Most people consider that 
climate change is the most serious of those (e.g. 
BBC/PIPA/GlobeScan, 2007; European Commission, 2011). 
Tackling climate change would require fundamental transformations 
and substantial cuts in modes of energy generation and use. It is 
known that this transition should begin as soon as possible to avoid 
the worst impacts of the enhanced greenhouse effect. However, 
despite the increasing availability of information, the world has not 
been making progress towards putting in place effective responses to 
climate change. How do we reconcile awareness of the problem with 
acceptance of the system of social, economic and political practices 
and relations that generate that problem? This chapter aims to 
contribute to understanding this knowledge-inaction paradoxby focusing 
on the media, a privileged space for negotiation of the meaning of 
social problems, and examining the extent to which the media may 
contribute to political immobilism and the continuation of business-
as-usual.  
Notwithstanding (occasional) earlier references to the issue, 
climate change has been under the media spotlight in many countries 
since the late 1980s (cf. Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Carvalho et al., 
2011; Mazur, 1998). This prolonged mediatization has certainly 
influenced social representations of climate change and of climate 
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change politics. Contributing to understand the ways in which the 
media have socially constructed climate change and the implications 
this may have for the choices that are (to be) made is an important 
goal for communication scholars. In this chapter, I argue that 
mainstream media discourses have generated a symbolic terrain that 
promotes inaction, reinforcing the current socio-economic-political 
system and the habitual practices of energy use and GHG emissions. 
Three themes will be analyzed: remaining denialism towards the 
scientific consensus (i.e., the continuous expression of skepticism and 
the organized rejection of the growing scientific consensus regarding 
the need to act on climate change); alarming climate change and 
alarmist - optimistic media discourses (i.e. the media-created image of 
climate change being split between over-dramatization and 
unfounded optimistic); and the hegemony of techno-managerial 
practices and of sustainable development discourses (i.e. the 
prevalence of technical and managerial „solutions‟ to climate change 
and of ambiguous discourses on sustainable development). All these 
aspects shed light on the knowledge-inaction paradox that has been 
referred above and the roles of the media. 
Remaining denialism towards the scientific consensus 
In its latest Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) maintained that „warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of 
increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread 
melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.‟ (2007a: 
2). In reviewing the research conducted on climate change in multiple 
scientific disciplines, the IPCC regularly produces a summary of the 
state of scientific knowledge, which is carefully examined and 
thoroughly discussed until it meets the approval of representatives of 
all participating governments. Reflecting the accumulation of 
knowledge over the last three decades, with each Assessment Report, 
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the IPCC has offered a graver image of climate change infused of a 
growing degree of certainty. 
The First IPCC Assessment Report (1990: 2) claimed that 
„[n]atural terrestrial ecosystems could face significant consequences as 
a result of the global increases in the atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases and the associated climatic changes‟ (my emphasis). 
It employed a similarly cautious language regarding impacts on 
oceans and coastal zones, human settlements and several other 
domains. Since then, the IPCC has successively increased its 
confidence in the detection of impacts of climate change. In the 
Fourth Assessment Report, it stated that it had high to very high 
confidence of significant impacts of climate change on natural 
systems, hydrological systems and biological systems (IPCC, 2007b). 
High confidence is defined as „about 8 out of 10 chance of being correct‟ 
and very high confidence as „at least 9 out of 10 chance‟ (p. 21).  
Anthropogenic contribution to climate change has also been 
asserted in increasingly certain terms. The Second Assessment Report 
asserted in 1996 that the „balance of evidence suggest[ed] a 
discernible human influence on global climate.‟ (IPCC, 1996: 4) The 
latest Assessment Report maintains that „most of the observed 
increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is 
very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas concentrations.‟ (IPCC, 2007a: 5) (emphasis in original). In this 
document, „very likely‟ refers to a „>90% probability of occurrence‟ 
(p.3) of an outcome or result. Moreover, based on thousands of data 
series and increasingly sophisticated scenarios, the IPCC has 
successively raised the upper limits of projected warming in the 21st 
century, which is 6.4 °C in the Fourth Assessment Report. 
There are other indications of a significant consensus on 
climate change and anthropogenic warming. In a well-known review 
published in 2004, Naomi Oreskes analyzed the abstracts of 928 
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articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals and 
found that none contradicted the claims of the IPCC on 
anthropogenic climate change. Moreover, Oreskes stated that „all 
major scientific bodies in the United States whose members‟ expertise 
bears directly on the matter have issued similar statements‟ to those 
of the IPCC (2004: 1686). 
Against this background, mainstream media in several countries 
have created a picture of divisiveness and contention in the scientific 
community regarding anthropogenic climate change. This is the case 
of the USA, Australia and the United Kingdom (e.g. Boykoff and 
Boykoff, 2004; McKewon, 2012; Carvalho, 2007), all of which have 
important contributions to the global greenhouse effect. Probably the 
most important case, given its contribution to global GHG emissions, 
the United States‟ media have repeatedly been shown to over-
represent the claims of the so-called „skeptics‟, who argue that climate 
change is not taking place or that it is due to natural factors. Climate 
„skeptics‟, often also called „denialists‟ or „contrarians‟, tend to have 
no relevant professional credentials nor produce research that is 
recognized as valid by the scientific community. However, Antilla 
(2005) found that both US newspapers and news wire services, such 
as the Associated Press, gave them a large visibility. News wires have 
a key role in propagating ways of reporting across all types of news 
media, which adds to the seriousness of these findings. In a widely 
cited study, Boykoff and Boykoff (2004: 129) showed that in 52,65% 
of stories in the US prestige press between 1988-2002 „balanced 
accounts prevailed; these accounts gave „„roughly equal attention‟‟ to 
the view that humans were contributing to global warming, and the 
other view that exclusively natural fluctuations could explain the 
earth‟s temperature increase.‟ Boykoff (2008) found that over the 
period 1995-2004 the same trend was present in 70% of US television 
news segments across four of the most watched networks. These 
researchers claimed that this was due to journalists following the 
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professional norm of balance in reporting. In this case, balance meant 
bias as it significantly deviated from the scientific consensus. In 
another study, Boykoff and Boykoff (2007) argued that the weight of 
skepticism in the US media was also due other journalistic norms, 
such as dramatization, personalization and novelty, that pushed 
journalists to award a disproportionate attention to „skeptics‟. 
Several studies have looked at factors that are external to the 
media and pointed to an extraordinary pro-activity of social actors 
that are hostile to climate policy in attempting to shape the public 
debate. McCright and Dunlap (2000; 2003) have described the ways 
in which conservative institutions promote doubt on climate change 
through policy studies, books, press releases, opinion-editorial essays, 
and advertisements. Numerous conservative think tanks have aligned 
with climate skeptics, often affiliated with the fossil fuel industry, to 
block the passage of any significant climate policy. Skeptical books 
were the focus of a study by Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman (2008): 
they showed that 92 per cent of those books published in the USA 
since 1992 were linked to conservative think tanks, which 
overwhelmingly espoused environmental skepticism. They concluded 
that these think tanks have contributed to weaken the US 
commitment to environmental protection. Oreskes and Conway 
(2010) compared denialism of climate change with the long 
campaigns carried out by industry to spread doubt and confusion 
regarding research that linked smoking to lung cancer, coal to acid 
rain and chlorofluorocarbons to stratospheric ozone depletion. By 
undermining public confidence in the scientific consensus and 
„keeping the controversy alive‟ business interests and conservative 
think tanks succeeded, with the compliance of the mainstream media, 
to stall action for a long time. 
In Australia, research has also shown that climate skeptics tend 
to get their claims extensively reproduced in the media (e.g. 
McKewon, 2012). In some cases, the distortion in the representation 
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of scientific knowledge reaches extreme levels as in the case of The 
Australian newspaper where, of 880 items published between 2004 
and 2011, 700 items rejected the scientific consensus and the need for 
action on climate change (Manne, 2011 cit. by McKewon, 2012). 
McKewon (2012) has shown how a neoliberal think tank, the 
Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), which is strongly opposed to action 
on climate change, has acted as a powerful news source in Australia. 
This think tank conducts various activities aimed at the media, 
including publishing op-ed comments in the press, inviting journalists 
and editors to its lectures and seminars, and publishing books and a 
magazine. The analysis of articles from the IPA magazine and op-eds 
published in Australian newspapers by IPA staff, together with the 
analysis of newspaper editorials and opinion columns that gave 
positive coverage to a well-known Australian skeptic, indicates that 
conservative media very often offer a stage for IPA‟s „fantasy themes‟, 
such as the notion that the environmental movement is a new form 
of religion that is intolerant and irrational. 
In the USA or Australia not all the media followed the 
dominant trends described above. As McKewon (2012: 3) notes, the 
ideology espoused by each news organ is often a differentiating factor 
in discourses on climate change with denialism typically coming from 
those that „promote core values of the political Right - free market 
capitalism, anti-socialism, privatisation, small government and 
deregulation‟ including „opposition to industry oversight and 
environmental regulations‟. In an extensive study of the British press, 
I have argued that the representation of scientific knowledge has been 
shaped by ideological cultures, i.e. shared values and worldviews that 
were dominant in different newsrooms (Carvalho, 2007). I found that 
the aspects of scientific progress that were selected for news reports, 
the kind of readings of climate change that they came to support, 
how forecasts were interpreted, and how uncertainty was represented 
were all associated with the ideological positions of newspapers. 
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Hence, while the Guardian and the Independent most of the time 
promoted the reliability of research that showed that climate change 
was taking place, the Times,which espouses a conservative ideology, 
often used uncertainty or disagreement to undermine the authority of 
science, to discursively dismiss the risks associated to climate change 
and, thereby, to de-legitimise or refute political actions that might 
alter the economic and lifestyle status quo (especially during the 
1990s). The ideological divide in the British press has been recently 
confirmed in Painter‟s (2011) extensive study. Focusing on public 
views, Whitmarsh (2009) in turn reported strong variations in climate 
skepticism between voters in different British parties: Conservative, 
Liberal Democrats, Labour and Green in decreasing order. 
Ideological factors are also at play in the USA where there is an 
association between political-ideological standings of citizens and 
concern for climate change (Zia and Todd, 2010), as well as a 
growing gap between Republicans and Democrats regarding the 
belief that the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated in the 
news (Dunlap and McCright, 2008). Feldman et al. (2012) compared 
climate change coverage in Fox News, CNN and MSNBC and found 
that in the first network doubters were more frequently interviewed 
than believers. They cite survey data that shows that Fox viewership 
is negatively associated with acceptance of climate change. 
Significantly, Republicans are more susceptible than Democrats to 
influence by television coverage of climate change, independent of 
how well a channel aligns with their views. This has a positive 
implication for the possibility of consensus-building as „at least some 
Republicans, who as a group tend to be predisposed toward global 
warming skepticism, are less skeptical when exposed to information 
on the reality and urgency of climate change.‟ (p. 24) 
It is also positive to notice that, just as there are important 
differences between media, so there are between countries. For 
instance, in Germany (Peters and Heinrichs, 2008), Portugal 
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(Carvalho et al., 2011), France, India, China and Brazil (Painter, 2011) 
skeptical views occupy very little media space. It is likely that a 
combination of socio-cultural, political and media-related factors 
(Painter, 2011) contribute to these international differences. 
Nevertheless, the fact that skepticism continues to imprint a large 
part of the media depictions in the countries examined in this section 
–United States, United Kingdom and Australia, all of which are key 
to the international politics of climate change– is likely to impede or 
slow down the adoption of effective responses to climate change. 
The confusion that results from this persistent denialism is well 
exemplified in the results of a US survey conducted in 2007. People 
were asked „what comes closer to your own view - most scientists 
think global warming is happening, (or) most scientists think global 
warming is not happening, or there is a lot of disagreement among 
scientists about whether or not global warming is happening, or do 
you not know enough to say?‟. Only 3% said „it is not happening‟ and 
48% said „it is happening‟. Most significantly, however, at a time 
when the IPCC had announced the conclusions presented above, 
40% of the US public answered „there is a lot of disagreement‟ (Yale, 
Gallup, ClearVision Institute, 2007).  
Alarming climate change and alarmist - optimistic media 
discourses  
Climate change is a domain where forecasting is crucial. Unlike other 
domains where what matters is knowing how things are, in climate 
change it is essential to have an idea of how things will be. Futurology 
necessarily involves a degree of uncertainty. This has opened the way 
to very different media representations of the future. In their analysis 
of the British press, Ereaut and Segnit (2006) found that there were 
two dominant „linguistic repertoires‟ – an alarmist one and an 
optimistic one. The alarmist repertoire suggested that the world is 
inevitably lost due to climate change and that it is too late to do 
anything. The logical consequence is that we should just continue 
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with life-as-we-know-it and all the usual GHG emitting practices. The 
optimistic repertoire has two main variations. The first one promises 
that everything will be fine without any need to act, either because 
climate change claims are false, because the free market will solve 
climate change or because of some similarly „passive‟ way of getting 
out of the problem. The second variation points to a happy ending if 
we act on climate change and suggests that technological options, 
small corporate actions or small behavioral changes can deliver the 
solution to climate change. 
Although Ereaut and Segnit‟s (2006) proposal is simplistic, it 
calls attention to two opposing tendencies that can be found in the 
media. On the one hand, the media often disseminate optimistic 
views of climate change. Many –although by no means all– are linked 
to the denialist discourses discussed above that reject the scientific 
grounds for acting on climate change. On the other hand, there is an 
over-dramatization of climate change (and especially of its impacts) in 
many media reports. By over-dramatization I mean the depiction of 
extreme impacts of climate change as inevitable (when in fact we are 
talking about forecasts and there is a possibility that those impacts do 
not materialize if concerted mitigating action is put in place) and a 
distortion of the temporal scale (making extreme impacts seem much 
closer in time than what is likely to happen). Although the IPCC 
scenarios point to a global mean temperature rise of up to 6.4  C, 
such level and the worst impacts of climate change can still be 
avoided if aggressive mitigation measures are implemented; 
moreover, those impacts are not likely to occur in the next few years 
but in the space of several decades. 
Media representations of climate change often suggest that we 
are faced with an eminent catastrophe and that there is nothing that 
can be done about it.  
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„The alarmist repertoire is typified by an inflated or extreme 
lexicon. It incorporates an urgent tone („we have to act. Now. 
Today!‟) and cinematic codes, with images and ways of speaking 
that are familiar from horror and disaster films („astonishing 
scenes that might have come straight from Hollywood‟ (Catt 
2005). 
It employs a quasi-religious register of doom, death, judgement, 
heaven and hell, using words such as „catastrophe‟, „chaos‟ and 
„havoc‟. It uses a language of acceleration, increase, intractability, 
irreversibility and momentum („temperatures shot up‟, „process of 
change… surged ahead‟, „a tipping point beyond which break-up is 
explosively rapid‟ (Leake and Milne 2006)). It allows for no 
complexity or middle ground –it is simply extreme.‟ (Ereaut and 
Segnit, 2006: 13) 
Some have referred to these kinds of media reports as „climate 
porn‟ (Lowe, 2006; Hulme, 2009). They have an important position in 
the media-constructed images that circulate in various societies. 
Weingart et al. (2000) traced the evolution of meanings of climate 
change in Germany for two decades and pointed out that the term 
„climate catastrophe‟ originated in the mid-1980s; it was first 
disseminated by Der Spiegel magazine and had an extensive influence 
on discourses on climate change. Doulton and Brown (2009) 
examined the British coverage of climate change and development 
and found that it was clearly dominated by a discourse of „potential 
catastrophe‟, with developing countries appearing „defenceless 
without the help of the West‟ (p. 191). In the USA, Foust and 
Murphy (2009) also found ample evidence of an „apocalyptic‟ portrait 
of climate change (we will return to their analysis further down in this 
chapter). 
Alarmist discourses are likely to have important implications for 
public understanding of and engagement with climate change. Studies 
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in the US, the UK and other countries have shown that the dominant 
imagery that people associate with climate change includes things 
such as melting ice caps, storms, floods, heat waves and other 
impacts that they classify as negative or very negative (Leiserowitz, 
2005; Lorenzoni et al., 2006). In free word association exercises 
conducted in Portugal, people predominantly referred to notions of 
pollution, destruction, diseases, droughts and forest fires, as well as to 
the issues mentioned for the other countries (Cabecinhas, Lázaro and 
Carvalho, 2006; 2008). There were no mentions of things that people 
can do to address climate change, such as cycling, installing solar 
panels or turning down the heating. This was interpreted as meaning 
that people view themselves as (potential) victims of climate change 
but not as agents of resolution of the problem. 
Perceived lack of agency was also identified in another study in 
association with common visual representations of climate change 
such as polar bears, industrial smoke stacks, flooded areas, and 
starving children and dried up lakes with dead fish (O‟Neill and 
Nicholson-Cole, 2009). While these are often chosen by the media to 
convey the gravity of climate change, they were amongst the images 
that participants said made them feel least able to do something about 
climate change. Still, participants considered that those images (with 
the exception of polar bears) were the ones that made climate change 
feel the most important to them. In contrast, participants said that 
images of a low energy light bulb, a cyclist and a thermostat were the 
ones that made them feel most able to act.  
O‟Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) conclude that: 
„dramatic, sensational, fearful, shocking, and other climate 
change representations of a similar ilk can successfully capture 
people‟s attention to the issue of climate change and drive a 
general sense of the importance of the issue. However, they are 
also likely to distance or disengage individuals from climate 
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change, tending to render them feeling helpless and 
overwhelmed when they try to comprehend their own 
relationship with the issue‟ (p. 375) 
They make the case against using „fear appeals‟ because of the 
difficulties of sustaining fear in the long term; the fact that individuals 
may become desensitized to fear appeals; that fear may damage trust 
in the communicating organization; and that fear appeals may 
generate unintended consequences, such as denial or apathy. Hulme 
(2008) has also spoken of a „discourse of fear‟ associated with the idea 
of „climate as catastrophe‟ and has argued that this kind of media 
coverage may be counterproductive for involving the public (2007). 
Moser and Dilling (2007) make similar arguments. 
Swyngedouw (2010) takes the implications of this form of 
depicting climate change further: by being presented in apocalyptic 
terms and reduced to a problem of CO2 emissions, he argues, climate 
change has given rise to a hegemonic populist proposal that promises 
solutions within the structures of capitalism and the market economy. 
In this reading, alarmist discourses create favourable conditions for 
the emergence of optimistic discourses centered on the promises of a 
„green economy‟. As discussed in the next section, this helps the 
reproduction of the economic-political system. 
One variety of optimistic discourses is centered on high-tech 
solutions such as geoengineering. These can also gain symbolic value 
due to apocalyptic visions of climate-altered futures: these `ultimate 
solutions‟ (…) are enlivened by the dramatizations of apocalyptic 
futures in which the only way to act seems to be to adopt spectacular 
techniques of/for control.‟ (de Goede and Randalls, 2009: 871). 
Journalistic norms may play a role in the construction of 
alarmist images of climate change. Dramatization, for instance, is a 
known tendency in news making as a way of appealing to audiences 
(Boykoff and Boykoff, 2007); moreover, the media tend to look for 
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certainty rather than „fuzzy‟ probabilities and often overemphasize 
that certainty (e.g. Smith, 2005). However, this kind of discourse also 
stems from other sources, such as non-governmental organizations 
and official agencies whose campaigns often overdramatize climate 
forecasts. Therefore, they are quite widespread and keep being 
promoted by different social actors. The research perspectives 
discussed above suggest that these alarmist messages are not 
conducive to action on climate change, something that the optimistic 
discourses do not require either, therefore keeping us stuck in the 
knowledge-inaction paradox. 
One important question is whether all apocalyptic images of 
climate-altered futures should be abandoned. Several researchers 
argue in favour of investing on forms of communication that work as 
motivators of the public using meaningful, locally relevant and 
empowering symbols instead (e.g. O‟Neill and Nicholson-Cole, 2009; 
O‟Neill and Hulme, 2009). Others postulate that the dangers that 
climate change may bring onto the planet should be kept in citizens‟ 
sight. Based on existing scientific knowledge, Risbey (2008) maintains 
that there are grounds for alarming (rather than alarmist) discourses 
that point to the seriousness of the problem but also to possibilities 
of action. While noting that the „apocalyptic tone of climate change 
rhetoric may not only encourage a feeling of despair in the face of 
impending disaster, but also contributes to skeptics‟ ability to 
discredit climate scientists as alarmists‟, Foust and Murphy (2009: 
154) also remark that „environmental advocates like Rachel Carson 
have successfully relied upon dire predictions of the world‟s end to 
provoke necessary action‟. They identify two variations of the 
apocalyptic frame: „a tragic apocalypse, characterized by „„resignation‟‟ 
(Burke, 1984, p. 37) to a foretold ending; and a comic apocalypse, 
discernible through its more forgiving outlook on humanity „„not as 
vicious, but mistaken‟‟ (Burke, 1984, p. 41).‟ The two frames differ in 
their constructions of agency, temporality, and telos. While in tragic 
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apocalypse, a catastrophic telos is unavoidable and outside of the 
scope of human agency, in the comic perspective humans are 
responsible for a course of action and can influence their future, 
which is more open-ended than in the tragic version. Foust and 
Murphy (2009) recommend that communication on climate change 
employ this second frame and is directed towards promoting human 
agency for correcting a mistaken path that leads to disaster.  
Hegemony of techno-managerial practices and of Sustainable 
Development discourses  
In the discourses that circulate in the public sphere –and particularly 
in mainstream media– climate change has recurrently been viewed 
through a techno-managerial lens, that is, as an issue that is amenable 
to technical solutions and management options. In many political and 
media discourses there appears to be a belief in science-based techno-
fixes that would „solve‟ climate change and allow for the maintenance 
of current lifestyles and forms of consumption. We are „sold‟ fuel 
cells, solar-powered planes or mega-projects for wind energy, and 
told that these technological innovations will disseminate rapidly and 
substitute old forms of energy production and use, thereby creating a 
new „low carbon world‟ (cf. Nerlich, 2012) where climate change is no 
longer a problem. In these discourses, the „market‟ is offered as the 
key for the uptake of those solutions: sates can play a role in initiating 
the process of dissemination of technological innovations through 
financial and fiscal stimuli but it will be the free market who will 
determine their success or failure. With appropriate regulatory 
measures and other instruments for controlling emissions and 
managing climate change, we are told, climate change can be 
prevented and continuous economic growth can be promoted. 
The primacy of the economy has marked international climate 
politics since its inception. It is in fact inscribed in the founding 
document, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
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Change (UNFCCC), which states that its aim is to achieve 
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
„within a time-frame sufficient to (…) enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner‟ (my emphasis). However, the main drive 
for the development of market-based approaches to climate change 
was the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997. The Protocol created the so-
called „flexibility mechanisms‟, namely Emissions Trading (the 
possibility of selling and buying GHG emissions quotas), the Clean 
Development Mechanism (which refers to emission-reduction 
projects in developing countries carried out by countries committed 
to reduce or control their emissions) and Joint Implementation 
(which refers to emission-reduction projects in other countries 
committed to reducing or controlling emissions). These are market-
based forms of managing a country‟s GHG emissions. 
Kyoto‟s „flexibility mechanisms‟ have opened the way to 
financial speculation and inappropriate implementation, and their 
efficacy has been severely criticized by several non-governmental 
organizations and other analysts. Yet, the language that is found in 
most public discourses still privileges market-based solutions. In the 
last few years, the main focus has been on the notion of „green 
growth‟, an idea strongly promoted by political leaders and 
international agencies. „Green growth‟ advances a new economic 
optimism that suggests the possibility of large financial gains from 
investments in „environmentally-friendly‟ areas, such as renewable 
energies. This fits in with a discourse that has been labelled as 
Ecological Modernization and that draws on the discourse of 
Sustainable Development, both of which are discussed below.  
Sustainable Development, explicitly inscribed in the UNFCCC, 
became the default option in mainstream „greenspeak‟ (Harré, 
Brockmeier and Mühlhäusler, 1999) in the last couple of decades. As 
formulated by the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (1987), the discourse of Sustainable Development 
235 
 
advocated balancing three aspects: environmental protection, 
economic growth and social justice. However, as the notion of 
Sustainable Development spread and came to be employed by many 
different social actors in many different contexts, its original meaning 
was often diluted and it acquired a variety of nuances: ecologically 
sustainable, socially sustainable, economically sustainable, sustained 
economic growth, etc. Oels (2011: 8) has argued that in the last few 
years Sustainable Development has been „redefined as „climate-
proofing‟ economic development‟. In short, Sustainable 
Development became a rather ambiguous concept. It has been widely 
used by well-meaning progressive organizations but it has also often 
been used to „greenwash‟ (Greer and Bruno, 1996) the image of faulty 
corporations and by everyone else between these two extremes. 
Ambiguity is in fact part of the strength of the notion of Sustainable 
Development as consensus thrives in relation to ambiguous, open-
ended ideas.  
Ecological Modernisation, a variant of Sustainable 
Development, converts environmental problems into economic 
opportunities. As Hajer (1996: 249) puts it: Ecological Modernisation 
„makes the „ecological deficiency‟ of industrial society into the driving 
force for a new round of industrial innovation. (...) Remedying 
environmental damage is seen as a „positive sum game‟: 
environmental damage is not an impediment for growth; quite the 
contrary, it is the new impetus for growth.‟ Science and technology 
are presented as the source of solutions to „fix‟ the environment while 
providing economic gains. This is a highly attractive prospect and it is 
not surprising that „consensual‟ Sustainable Development and 
Ecological Modernisation have become hegemonic. Together with 
Luke (1995), I have previously argued that these ideas have a 
disciplinary rolein relation to more radical forms of environmental 
discourse and mobilization: because they are integrative and 
conciliatory, these discourses annihilate any possibility of opposition 
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(Carvalho, 2005). In Swyngedouw‟s words (2010: 228): „the 
sustainability argument has evacuated the politics of the possible, the 
radical contestation of alternative future socio-environmental 
possibilities and socio-natural arrangements, and has silenced the 
antagonisms and conflicts that are constitutive of our socio-natural 
orders by externalizing conflict.‟ 
Most media have strengthened the discourses of Sustainable 
Development and Ecological Modernisation as they naturalize and 
neutralize them. Any discussion about the viability of the promises of 
those discourses or of alternative ways of framing responses to 
climate change, including decreases in energy use through legislation, 
behavioural change and transformation of economic and political 
structures, is very rarely present in mainstream media. Sustainable 
Development and Ecological Modernisation thus appear „natural‟, the 
only („sensible‟) solutions to the problem of climate change. 
Moreover, the values that are inscribed in these discourses are 
suppressed making them appear neutral. 
Based on an analysis of international press coverage since 1985, 
Nerlich (2012: 43) has observed a clear reproduction of the 
Ecological Modernization discourse: „low-carbon technologies and 
low-carbon economies are now increasingly touted as roadmaps to a 
brave new low carbon world or low carbon future. (…) The strategic use of 
low carbon as a compound in industry and policy making (…) has 
created discursive frames linked to expectations of great future riches 
to be made and of technological fixes to climate change that can be 
„bought‟.‟ (emphasis in original) Carvalho et al. (2011) found a similar 
pattern in the Portuguese press, which has tended to amplify 
governmental promotion of renewable energies as the solution to 
climate change (and to the country‟s economic troubles). Koteyko 
(2012) speaks of a „market-driven sustainability‟ regarding British 
media discourses on carbon emissions. She found that in recent years, 
the media have often set up… 
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„… equivalences between the application of the marketplace 
instruments of carbon trading and investment and sustainability 
practices. Such reporting promotes recontextualisation 
(Calsamiglia and Van Dijk, 2004) of sustainability within the 
confines of corporate discourse through the use of carbon 
compounds and accompanying finance terms. Drawing on the 
environmental values on the one hand and the language of 
finance and accounting on the other, such newspaper stories 
reproduce neoliberal logics as a legitimate methodology for 
addressing the issue of global warming.‟ (p. 33) 
This suggests that the media have helped the appropriation (some 
would say hijacking) of the discourse of Sustainable Development by 
business. 
Yet, evidence of the failure of these approaches to deal with 
climate change is accumulating. Mitchell (2012: 24) has noted that 
„scientific and political debates are dominated by a “technophilic 
optimism” that projects emission reductions from technological 
improvement that are not supported by the evidence‟ and pointed out 
the need for substantive measures to constrain population, affluence 
and consumption. A recent report of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has similarly offered a very 
critical view of the hype around „green growth‟. Noting that many 
„economists and policy makers advocate a fundamental shift towards 
“green growth” as the new, qualitatively-different growth paradigm, 
based on enhanced material/resource/energy efficiency and drastic 
changes in the energy mix‟, the report argues that „growth, 
technological, population-expansion and governance constraints as 
well as some key systemic issues cast a very long shadow on the 
“green growth” hopes and points out that it „may rather give much 
false hope and excuses to do nothing really fundamental that can 
bring about a U-turn of global GHG emissions‟ (Hoffmann, 2011: 1). 
„What is required‟, the author continues, „is not a relative, but an 
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absolute decoupling of economic growth from MRE 
[material/resource/energy] throughput, and that at an unprecedented 
scale in a historically very short period of time‟ (p. 2). The 
transformations needed to achieve this are, predictably, extremely 
large and fundamental and include, according to this report 
„democratization of the economy and cultural change‟ in respect for 
„global equality of opportunity for prosperity‟ (p. 1). 
When the media overwhelmingly sideline these aspects and 
reduce climate change to a Sustainable Development/Ecological 
Modernization frame they may be trapping citizens into false beliefs 
and preventing other forms of individual and collective engagement 
with the issue of social and political significance. 
Closing remarks 
The media are a space of confluence and negotiation of multiple 
understandings. Both the media and a variety of other social actors 
have attempted to determine the meaning of climate change from 
different political and ideological standpoints. Media(ted) discourses 
have helped create systems of intelligibility for interpreting and 
making decisions on climate change that tend to appear natural and 
neutral. This chapter has attempted to expose the arbitrary nature of 
dominant discourses and to understand their contribution to inaction 
despite growing awareness and knowledge of the risks associated with 
climate change. 
In face of growing scientific consensus, a number of 
organizations continue to spread doubt and in several countries 
mainstream media continue to host those voices and to propagate 
denialism of climate change, thus building the symbolic grounds for 
inaction. Ironically, through overdramatization of risks and/or the 
dissemination of unfounded optimistic discourses, many media 
reports have contributed to apathy, denial and/or inaction towards 
climate change. Moreover, by amplifying techno-managerial solutions 
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and helping turn the discourses of Sustainable Development and 
Ecological Modernization hegemonic the media have helped produce 
a „post-political‟ consensus where „free market environmentalism‟ is 
the only discursive possibility. The governance of climate change has 
excluded democratic debate and decision-making. By failing to 
consider alternative views on the relation between humans and 
nature, and on relevant social arrangements, most mainstream media 
have legitimated and reinforced the existing social and political order.  
Our common future depends on „opening up new spaces to 
critical political imaginaries and debates‟ (De Goede and Randals, 
2009: 874) that may counter the dominant (consensual) framing for 
addressing climate change. In the last few years, some climate 
activists, some social movements and some alternative media have 
distanced themselves from such framing and rejected the idea that 
solutions can be found within the existing structures. These are 
hopeful –albeit extremely feeble– signs towards rethinking the politics 
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